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The argument against skepticism relying on content externalism, which was made 
famous by Hilary Putnam, has been considered inconclusive by many philosophers. 
However, some believe that this argument has precluded the possibility of skeptical 
hypotheses. These hypotheses typically are fictional scenarios where a deceptive 
power makes your experiences indistinguishable from those you would have if you 
were not in such a scenario, making most of your justified belief false. Some 
philosophers, such as Anthony Brueckner and Jon Altschul, have taken this 
problem seriously and, in response to Putnam, have developed an alternative to the 
argument from ignorance: the piecemeal fashion strategy. I wish to defend, contra 
Brueckner and Altschul, the idea that some skeptical hypotheses remain 
untouched by content externalism, making the piecemeal fashion strategy obsolete. 
1. The argument from ignorance 
The most common argument presented to support skepticism 
about the external world is the argument by skeptical hypothesis, or 
‘‘argument from ignorance’’1. This argument, popularized by 
Descartes in his first meditation, has spawned a literature of its own. I 
plan here to examine a response to the skeptical challenge relying on 
semantic considerations. This response was first brought up by Hilary 
Putnam in Reason, Truth and History2 and has been largely commented, 
______________ 
* L’auteur est étudiant au baccalauréat en philosophie (Université de 
Montréal). 
1 Lemos, N. (2007), An Introduction to the Theory of Knowledge, p. 140-141. 
2 Putnam, H. (1981), Reason, Truth and History, p. 10. We should note that 
Putnam himself never claimed that content externalism was an effective way 
to defeat skepticism. 
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even though many philosophers consider it inconclusive. Indeed, 
even if the skeptic accepts the idea of content externalism on which 
Putnam is relying, it appears that there is still room for him to attain 
his philosophical goals through various strategies. One of these is 
what I may call the ‘‘piecemeal fashion’’ strategy expounded by 
Anthony Brueckner3. This strategy was meant as a response to the 
claim that the content externalism thesis prevailed on the use of 
skeptical hypotheses. In this short paper, I defend, contra Brueckner, 
the possibility of skeptical hypotheses even if we accept Putnam’s 
argument. 
Let us first present the argument from ignorance. Suppose, for a 
moment, that you own a red car. Knowing that your car is red and 
knowing that red isn’t blue, you should know that your car is not 
blue. In other words, if you know p and that p logically entails ¬q (in 
which case, q is a ‘‘counterpossibility’’ of p), then you know ¬q. This 
rule of inference concerning knowledge is called the ‘‘closure 
principle’’. By modus tollens, if you do not know ¬q, then you do not 
know p. The argument from ignorance holds that, since you do not 
know that you are not in a given skeptical hypothesis, a 
counterpossibility to most of our claims about the external world 
(we’ll define such scenarios in a moment), you do not know most 
propositions you would make about the external world. In a more 
formal way, the argument from ignorance could be presented as such, 
where '→' stands for the material conditional, '→>' for the strict 
conditional and 'KS(p)' stands for 'S knows that p' : 





where p is any ordinary proposition about the external world that 
must be supported by some empirical evidence in order to possibly 
become a justified belief and sk a skeptical hypothesis in which p is 
false. 
______________ 
3 Brueckner, A. (2010), « Terms of Envatment (with Jon Altschul) », p. 174-
176. 
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This leads us to the question ‘‘What is a skeptical hypothesis?’’. I 
do not wish to present a detailed definition of such a scenario in this 
paper. However, it appears to me that a skeptical hypothesis must 
have at least two core features. First, the sensory experiences one has 
in a skeptical hypothesis must be indistinguishable from those one 
would have if they weren’t in such a situation (roughly, if they were in 
a ‘‘normal situation’’). Let us call this feature the ‘‘insensitivity 
requirement’’4. Second, most of the beliefs someone has about the 
external world must be false in a skeptical hypothesis.5 Let us call this 
second feature the ‘‘massive error requirement’’. If a fictional scenario 
does not fulfill these two requirements, I do not believe we could call 
it a skeptical hypothesis at all. 
2. Content externalism and skepticism 
Let us now consider the following scenario: somewhere in the 
universe is a brain in a vat, wired to a supercomputer. For the sake of 
the example, let us suppose that this situation is purely accidental: it is 
only a pure cosmic coincidence. The brain in this vat has no causal 
contact with ordinary objects, such as trees. However, the 
supercomputer generates impressions of ordinary objects in the brain 
in such a way that its impressions of trees are identical to ours. Some 
might be curious of the reasons to use such a peculiar scenario: 
indeed, the brain in a vat never had any contact with trees, hands or 
other objects. However, as we shall see, this apparent skeptical 
scenario can be dismissed by content externalism because of its 
peculiarity. Let us call a brain in this situation a Putnamian Brain in 
Vat (P-BIV).  
______________ 
4 Pritchard, D. (2009), Knowledge, p. 109-113. 
5 Some may be more demanding than me concerning this second feature 
and ask that all beliefs in such scenarios should be false. Although I do not 
have any strong argument against this request, I believe it is too demanding. 
Skepticism, at least the sort in which I am interested in, does not require us 
to be ignorant on everything about the external world (this is why most 
authors do consider the brain in a vat scenario to be a standard skeptical 
hypothesis, even though it does not hold every justified belief to be false: a 
belief such as ‘‘There is an external world’’ still appears to be true). 
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It may be difficult for our previous hypothesis to fulfill our two 
requirements. According to our skeptical argument, since we do not 
know we aren’t such P-BIV, we shouldn’t know that a normal sense-
based proposition such as ‘‘This is a tree’’ is true. However, it isn’t 
clear that we don’t. In his book Reason, Truth and History, Hilary 
Putnam argued that the word ‘‘tree’’, when uttered (or thought) by a 
P-BIV, does not refer to trees. So what does it refer to? What are the 
truth-conditions required for the sentence ‘‘This is a tree’’ to be true, 
when it goes through the mind of a P-BIV? Putnam gives three 
possibilities of what could be the reference of the word ‘‘tree’’.6 It 
could mean i. the succession of experiences this brain had about this 
object, ii. the electrical impulses that stimulate the brain to have the 
experience of what a normal human feels when perceiving a tree, or 
iii., the computer program features responsible for the electrical 
impulses described in ii7. Putnam does not say which of these 
candidates should count as the reference of the word ‘‘tree’’ when 
thought by the P-BIV. However, it appears that all these possible 
references are correct for the P-BIV. The P-BIV, speaking vat-
English, will most likely utter a true sentence when saying ‘‘Trees 
exist’’. This idea goes on for most words describing the external 
world, including ‘‘brain’’, ‘‘vat’’ and ‘‘supercomputer’’. Indeed, since 
the words ‘‘brain’’ and ‘‘vat’’ refer to (given that we accept iii.) 
computer programs, the P-BIV would say something false by uttering 
‘‘I am a brain in a vat’’. This threatens both the skeptic’s claim that 
we do not know anything of the external world but the fact that we 
do not know that we are not brains in a vat. It seems then that our P-
______________ 
6 Putnam, H. (1981), Reason, Truth and History, p. 10. 
7 I personally believe that we should reject i. and ii. on the basis that, if we 
accept one of these two candidates as the reference of the word ‘‘tree’’ in 
vat-English, there is nothing preventing us from accepting them as the 
reference of the word ‘‘tree’’ when uttered by a normal embodied human 
being. This leads to the inconvenience that the utterance ‘‘This is a tree’’ is 
true when you designate a tree and also when you designate a hologram of a 
tree. Since we do not wish our word ‘‘tree’’ to refer to the image of a tree 
nor to the electrical impulses caused by this plant, but rather to the object 
causing this experience, I suggest we apply the same logic to the reference of 
the word ‘‘tree’’ when uttered by a P-BIV (and thus, only consider iii. as a 
reference of this word). 
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BIV scenario does not meet our massive error requirement, 
preventing this scenario from being a skeptical hypothesis. 
As Brueckner points out in his article Terms of Envatment, the 
skeptic might reply that the putnamian response to skepticism is only 
sound against a quite narrow range of fictional scenarios. What 
happens if you were just recently envatted? The word ‘‘tree’’ would 
still refer to actual trees (and not to a computer program generating 
the impression of a tree). Having the sensory experience of a tree 
inside the vat, you would think ‘‘this is a tree’’ even though it is not 
true. Could the skeptic reach his goals by mean of this alternative 
scenario? Hardly. This is because even if you have been envatted an 
hour ago, you would still retain most of your beliefs concerning the 
real world via memory. This leads to the happy conclusion that you 
would, even if recently envatted, have mostly true beliefs. This 
variation on the brain in a vat case does not fulfill our massive error 
requirement. At this point, believes Brueckner, the skeptic may try to 
go the other way around and use another variation of the brain in a 
vat case. In this new scenario, you would have been envatted many 
years ago, when you were very young. However, it seems that, if we 
accept the content externalism on which Putnam is relying to prove 
that the P-BIV did not meet our massive error requirement, this 
scenario still faces a serious threat. Most externalists consider that, if 
you spend enough time in an environment in which you have the 
same sensory experiences you would have if you were in your original 
environment, your language will eventually shift in order to refer to 
this new environment. If you were brought to twin-earth and spent 
enough time there, the reference of the word ‘‘water’’ would shift 
from the chemical substance H2O to XYZ8. Hence, if the skeptic 
chooses to present a scenario in which you were envatted when you 
were young, chances are that your language has already suited your 
new environment. Consequently, most of your beliefs about what 
you now take to be trees would be true. This, again, concludes 
Brueckner, seems to keep the skeptic at bay, unable to present a 
hypothesis fulfilling our massive error requirement.  
______________ 
8 This is not, however, the only conceivable alternative. Some externalists 
believe that the word ‘‘water’’ will refer both to H2O and XYZ. In any case, 
your language will eventually change and connect to your new environment. 
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3. The piecemeal fashion strategy and the new skeptical 
hypotheses 
Yet, the skeptic does have room to elaborate his skeptical designs. 
One of the strategy available to him is the ‘‘piecemeal fashion’’ 
strategy, proposed by Brueckner9. The strategy is rather simple: since 
the argument from ignorance isn’t built to show that we don’t know a 
whole group of proposition (even though it is the goal of the skeptic) 
but rather a single proposition p about the external world, the 
piecemeal fashion strategy suggests to conceive an irrefutable 
scenario in which p is false only after we have been informed of what 
p is. If the skeptic wishes to disprove the claim that ‘‘I know I have 
hands’’, he will propose a scenario where one was recently envatted. 
If p is ‘‘the earth existed many years ago’’, he will propose a scenario à 
la Russell where the earth has come to existence, say, only two years 
ago. With this strategy, the skeptic creates many irrefutable scenarios 
in which only small amounts of beliefs (which are those his opponent 
pretends to know) are false. The fact that you cannot dismiss any of 
the numerous scenarios the skeptic presented leads to the conclusion 
that you are ignorant of any proposition that would have been false in 
one of those scenarios, an honest equivalent to the massive error 
feature. However, this strategy may sound a bit disappointing since it 
relies on a reply the skeptic would possibly make (hence, it prevents 
us from attacking the skeptical position directly by refuting a single 
skeptical hypothesis). However, the skeptic seems to reach his goals 
without the use of skeptical hypotheses, allowing him to dodge 
completely Putnam’s argument10.  
______________ 
9 Brueckner, A. (2010), ‘‘Terms of Envatment (with Jon Altschul)’’, p. 174-
176. 
10 Of course, it may be possible to use some responses relying on epistemic 
disjunctivism to this new strategy. However, I do not think this is the right 
place to start an inquiry on this particular topic. Yet, I would like to prevent 
a possible reply here. Some might say that the skeptic will quickly find 
himself limited in the examples he brings to reach his skeptical designs since 
some of them will surely contradict some others. This is a bad reading of the 
argument. If you do not know you are not in a scenario A, then you do not 
know the propositions that would have been false in A. If you do not know 
you are not in a scenario B, then you do not know the propositions that 
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As I agree with Brueckner’s thought about the possibility to use a 
plurality of non-skeptical hypotheses to achieve skepticism by the 
argument from ignorance, I do not believe the skeptic is forced in 
that direction. Considering that this strategy is particularly weak 
against other responses to skepticism, such as those brought by 
disjunctivism11, we should make sure it’s impossible to use skeptical 
hypotheses before relying on the piecemeal fashion strategy. I would 
like to submit here another way to construe skeptical hypotheses 
which would allow the use of our classical argument from ignorance. 
The problem with the previous hypotheses is that S’s language will, 
after some time, be replaced with a language that properly connects 
with S’s new environment. Let us say that ‘‘x’’ is the time S spends in 
a ‘‘normal’’ environment ‘‘e’’ before he gets envatted, falls under the 
demon’s domination or etc. Let us say that ‘‘α’’ be the time required 
by S to master a language and ‘‘β’’ the time required to switch from 
one language to another12. If the skeptic wishes to present a 
hypothesis where S has a language that will allow at least some error, 
then, at least, α = x. Now, if the skeptic wishes to continue and 
present a situation where S’s justified beliefs are mostly false, he must 
introduce an environment v1 drastically distinct from e (but similar in 
respect to S’s sensory experiences) where S goes after x (let us call the 
time spent in this new environment ‘‘a1’’). The skeptic wishing S to 
hold justified beliefs concerning v1 false must make sure that β > a1. 
But why stop here? The skeptic could submit a hypothesis where S is 
transported, after a1, in a third environment (v2) entirely different 
from the previous ones. The time spent in this third environment 
would be a2, where, of course β > a2. In such a hypothesis, S’s 
language is still the one that connects with e, despite the fact that 
most of his beliefs might concern v1 and v2. Needless to say, this can 
                                                                                                 
would have been false in B and so on, even if A and B contradict one 
another. 
11 Conee, E. (2007), ‘‘Disjunctivism and anti-skepticism’’, p. 16-36. 
12 I make the distinction between α and β because is it not clear that α = β. If 
you mastered your native language at 15 and lived 45 more years outside the 
vat, it would surprise me that you would starts speaking vat-English only 
after 15 years in the vat. I believe we are under the impression that it would 
take much longer before you switch from English to vat-English. The only 
situation I can imagine where α = β would be if α = x. 
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go on and on. The skeptic can add any new environment vn to his 
hypothesis. The point is just to make sure that β > a1, β > a2, β > 
a3,… β > an but that {a1, a2, a3,… an} > x. It seems then, that our 
blueprint BP2 may work just fine13. Let us now lay down a token of a 
scenario following the structure of BP2 (i.e. a skeptical hypothesis). 
With this general method of creating skeptical hypotheses, I would 
like to present a token of such scenario (T-sk) allowing the argument 
from ignorance to stand still. 
T-sk: Suppose that you mastered your language at 12. Following 
your birthday, you were unfortunate enough to get yourself 
kidnapped by aliens. Taking you on their spaceship, they use a drug 
that plunges you into a dream lasting for, let us say, 5 years. The 
experiences you have inside your dream are undistinguishable from 
those you had when you were awake. Just as you were about to wake 
up, Descartes’ evil demon appears and starts manipulating your 
senses so that you keep the impression you are still on earth, doing 
whatever you thought you were doing. This evil demon keeps you 
under his domination for another 5 years. However, just as the evil 
demon was about to release you from his power, an evil 
neuroscientist (perhaps an alien who had the opportunity to study 
human brains) takes away your brain and puts it into the famous vat. 
The neuroscientist keeps the deception going for another 5 years. 
After that, your mind is transferred into a computer, thanks to the 
amazing alien technology. From that point, you are deceived by a 
supercomputer for another 5 years. And this masquerade goes on and 
on, changing the way you are deceived every 5 years until you reach 
your current age. 
______________ 
13 An alternative to the succession of new environments could be alternation 
between some of the environments in which S’s language do not connect. 
Suppose that S spends x time in e (where x = α) then he is brought into a 
new environment (v1). After a1, S spends the same time in a second (v2), 
then a third environment (v3). The skeptic could subsequently propose that 
S returned to v1 for some time and then again to v2 and v3. Even though S’s 
language only connects with e, most of S’s experiences (and utterances) will 
concern v1, v2 and v3. This has the advantage over our last strategy of being 
simpler in the formulation of skeptical hypotheses. It is, however, not 
entirely clear whether or not the time required to reach β in a given 
environment returns to zero if one leaves this environment for another. 
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In this skeptical hypothesis, most, if not all, of the justified beliefs 
you had concerning the external world in the last 20 years of your life 
are false. We could push the fiction even farther by adding that the 
earth was destroyed once you were on board the spaceship (hence, 
utterances such as ‘‘dogs exist’’, ‘‘my house is on earth’’, etc. would 
also be false). The insensitivity feature seems respected, allowing the 
skeptic to argue for the soundness of the second premise of the 
argument from ignorance, just as before. Furthermore, the fact that 
your language is still English (and not vat-English, dream-English, 
demon-English, etc.) allows the massive error feature to be generated. 
If, finally, we accept the closure principle, the argument from 
ignorance seems to succeed (or, at least, tends to keep the massive 
error feature available, even when faced with semantic responses in 
the spirit of Putnam). Despite what we might have first expected, this 
demonstrates that semantic externalism is, in the end, compatible 
with massive error. 
Before concluding, I would like to add that skeptical hypotheses, 
despite my own token of such scenarios, do not require to imagine 
radically different deceivers. To demonstrate this point with an 
example, we could imagine that v1 is a vat under the control of a 
supercomputer using the program ABC to simulate sensory 
experiences to S. If S stays long enough in this condition, his words 
might end up referring to the features of this ABC-program. Of 
course, in a skeptical hypothesis, S would be moved to a new 
environment v2 before this. But here’s the point: v2 could be a new 
vat where another program, named XYZ, is used to simulate reality. 
XYZ is different from ABC in his inner operations but it generates 
the illusion of reality with the same precision S felt with ABC. 
Considering the presupposed differences between ABC and XYZ, I 
believe moving S from the ABC-vat to the XYZ-vat could be 
considered as a change in S’s environment. Of course, this could be 
applied in any skeptical hypothesis in a limitless manner14. Let us 
______________ 
14 Another tactic to formulate different environments for a skeptical 
hypothesis would be to simply say, as Thomas Nagel did, that S is placed in 
a world (v1) different from ours in ways we cannot conceive where our 
impressions and thoughts are produced in ways we cannot conceive. Thanks 
to the mist surrounding v1, the skeptic can postulate a second environment 
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specify that the fact that there is an infinite number of skeptical 
hypotheses do not contradict our claim that semantic externalism 
narrows the range of such scenarios. In calculus, there are, after all, 
some infinities that are greater than others. 
Some, perhaps many, may have find themselves dissatisfied with 
the account I gave of skeptical hypotheses. The paradigmatic example 
of such hypotheses was Descartes’, in whose writings it seemed that 
everything we believed about the external world was false. My 
personal account of such hypotheses was one in which only most of 
our beliefs were false. I must admit that this leads to a weaker form 
of skepticism. This charitable lecture of the skeptic’s position, 
however, is not irrelevant. If one of the goals of epistemology is to 
face the skeptic’s challenge successfully, I believe it must show that it 
must, at least, be epistemically possible that most of our beliefs 
constitute knowledge. This is exactly what is at stake when we start to 
consider the argument from ignorance. I tried to show that the 
classical argument from ignorance, seconded by skeptical hypotheses, 
was still potent, even if we accept content externalism. It appears that 
any philosopher hoping to defeat the skeptic will have to find a way 
to argue in favor of both positions against Brueckner’s strategy and 
against the argument from ignorance supported by the sustainable 
form of skeptical hypothesis I presented.  
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